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Hey, That's My Wife!-The Tort of
Alienation of Affection in Missouri
Thornburg v. Federal Express Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The tort of alienation of affection was first recognized in New York in
18662 and was eventually adopted by almost every jurisdiction in the United
States.' Missouri had recognized the tort as early as 1881' and continues to
recognize it to this day. Most jurisdictions, however, have subsequently
abolished the action either judicially or by statute.' This Note will first present
the facts and holding of the instant case. It will then provide the legal
background by briefly discussing the history of the tort of alienation of affection,
the related tort of criminal conversation in Missouri, the tort as applied to the
employer-employee setting, and the recent trend to abolish the common law
action. Finally, this Note will argue that Missouri should follow the general
trend and abolish the tort as well.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Keith Thornburg ("Mr. Thornburg") and Roberta Thomburg ("Ms.
Thornburg") had been married to each other since 1986.6 In 1997, Ms.
Thornburg began an affair with Wade Hunt ("Mr. Hunt"), her supervisor, while
she was employed by Federal Express ("Fed Ex").7 After discovering the affair,
Mr. Thornburg confronted Mr. Hunt.' Subsequently, Mr. Hunt terminated the
relationship with Ms. Thornburg,9 and in early 1998, the Thornburgs reconciled
their marriage.10
1. 62 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
2. See Hermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120, 120 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1866); see also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 918 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
3. PROSSER & KEATON, supra note 2, § 124, at 918. The only state that did not
adopt the tort was Louisiana. Id.
4. See Modisett v. McPike, 74 Mo. 636, 636 (Mo. 1881).
5. See infra Part III.D for a brief discussion on the abolition of the tort of alienation
of affection across the nation.
6. Thornburg, 62 S.W.3d at 424. The couple had two children during the course
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About the same time, an undisclosed number of Fed Ex employees "filed
grievances concerning Mr. Hunt's alleged sexual misconduct in the workplace
and alleged unlawful discrimination resulting from his misconduct."" A
subsequent probe by Fed Ex exposed the relationship between Ms. Thomburg
and Mr. Hunt. 2 Distressed by the situation, Ms. Thomburg "became unable to
safely or efficiently perform her current job duties and ... was placed on light-
duty assignments."1
3
After placing her on light-duty assignments, Fed Ex assisted Ms. Thornburg
with her attempts to find new employment outside of the company 4 and later
also offered Ms. Thornburg a transfer to a different office in Savannah,
Georgia. 5 Ms. Thomburg wanted to accept the offer and discussed the situation
with her husband, 6 but Mr. Thornburg refused to move and stated that if Ms.
Thornburg decided to relocate to Georgia, it would end the marriage. 7 The
ultimatum notwithstanding, Ms. Thornburg accepted the transfer offered by Fed
Ex. 8 On May 6, 1998, Ms. Thomburg moved with her two children to
Savannah, Georgia, while her husband was out of town.'
Upon arriving home from his trip, Mr. Thomburg discovered that his wife
and children had moved out of the family's house.2" He visited the Fed Ex
offices where his wife had been employed and requested information concerning
his wife's whereabouts.2' Fed Ex refused to disclose any information to Mr.
Thornburg.22
Consequently, Mr. Thornburg filed suit "in the Circuit Court of Cole
County alleging three separate counts against the defendants including: 1)
alienation of affection, 2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 3)




14. Id. Ms. Thomburg's attempt to find alternate employment was encouraged by
Fed Ex. Id. Ultimately, Ms. Thornburg was unable to find another job and remained
with the company. Id.
15. Id. at 424-25.
16. Id. at 425.
17. Id. "Mr. Thomburg told Ms. Thomburg that her accepting the transfer would
be a choice to abandon the marriage." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Fed Ex assisted Ms. Thomburg in facilitating her move to Georgia. Id. The
move occurred without Mr. Thomburg's knowledge. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. He "demanded to be told the new address and phone number of Ms.
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dismiss Mr. Thornburg's claims. 24 The court granted the motion and dismissed
the suit for failure to state a claim.25 Mr. Thornburg subsequently appealed the
trial court's ruling.
26
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District addressed each of
Mr. Thornburg's causes of action and affirmed the trial court's ruling.27 The
court held that Fed Ex's actions did not amount to tortious conduct for which it
could be held liable to Mr. Thomburg.2"
Id. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Tort of Alienation of Affection
The concept of permitting a husband to seek retribution from his wife's
lover originated in the Teutonic tribes.29 Their culture permitted the wronged
husband to kill his wife's lover if he found the lover and his wife engaging in
adulterous acts." As time progressed, however, husbands were no longer able
to take such extreme measures3 but instead, could extract a financial penalty
from the lover.3 2 The theory was that the husband would use the payment as
"means to purchase a new spouse."33 Such penalties were not extracted to foster
morality within the society; rather, the reason adultery was punished so severely




27. Id. at 426-29.
28. Id.
29. See Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn. 199 1). The term "Teutons"
is sometimes used generically to refer to Germanic peoples. 19 WORLD BOOK
MILLENNIUM 183 (2000 ed.). The term is derived from one of the tribes that comprised
the Germanic peoples. Id. The Teutons originally lived near the mouth of the Elbe River
before migrating to Gaul (which primarily is modem-day France). Id. While settling in
Gaul, the Teutons threatened Roman power during the second century B.C., and,
ultimately, the Roman army defeated the tribe in 102 B.C. Id.
30. Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651,654-
55(1930).
31. Id. at 655. The rise of Christianity may have played a role in the Teutonic
tribe's abandonment of the notion that the husband could lawfully kill his wife's lover.
See id.
32. Id. The amount of the penalty to be paid by the transgressor "depended upon
the station in life of the husband." Id.
33. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992).
34. Id. "The husband's right to punish the lover or to be compensated by him was
plainly derived from the importance of lawful issue of pure blood." Lippman, supra note
2003]
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Teutonic society, property was inherited through the father, and, therefore,
legitimacy was of the utmost importance."
As successors to the Teutonic tradition, the Anglo-Saxons provided a cause
of action for tortious interference with the marital relationship. 6 The basis for
the cause of action was that the wife was a valuable servant for the husband.37
Furthermore, the wife was considered to.be the husband's property, the loss of
which permitted the husband to seek compensation for damages. 8 Eventually,
early English common law essentially created what are now known as the
modem-day torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affection.39
In the United States, New York became the first state to recognize the tort
of alienation of affection. Ultimately, almost every state eventually adopted the
tort at common law.4' It has been traditionally held that there are certain rights
and obligations inherent in the marital relationship. The term "consortium" is
often used to describe the inherent rights and obligations flowing from one
spouse to the other. 3 These rights include "the affections, society, and
companionship of the other spouse, sexual relations and the exclusive enjoyment
of them, service in the home[,] and support."44 Interference with these rights was
30, at 655. "It is not likely that adultery was frowned upon for moral reasons, but
because of the importance of pedigree." Id.
35. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 423-24.
36. Id. at 424.
37. Id. "The wife was considered the husband's servant, and anyone who
interfered with the right of a master to the services of his servant was liable to him in
damages." Lippman, supra note 30, at 655-56.
38. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 424.
39. Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tenn. 1991). "Enticement... has
evolved into what is commonly known today as the tort of alienation of affections." Id.
"[S]eduction . .. today is commonly known as the tort of criminal conversation." Id.
Criminal conversation is "[a] tort action for adultery." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 380
(7th ed. 1999). Alienation of affection is "[a] tort claim for willful or malicious
interference with a marriage by a third party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 73 (7th ed.
1999).
40. See Hermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120, 120 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1866); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at 918.
41. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at 918. The only state that did not
adopt the tort was Louisiana. Id. Surprisingly, England has never recognized the tort of
alienation of affection. Id. § 124, at 930.
42. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 11.1, at 382-84 (2d student ed. 1988).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 cmt. c (1977).
44. Id. Originally, the injury resulting from the loss of consortium was the loss of
the services owed by a servant to the master. See Lippman, supra note 30, at 662. The
basis for permitting the husband to sue for the loss of consortium is predicated on the
notion that the wife is a servant of the husband. Lippman, supra note 30, at 653, 655-56.
[Vol. 68
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"viewed as depriving the marriage relationship of the conjugal relationship of
husband and wife."4 Consequently, the tort of alienation of affection was
widely adopted to vindicate a spouse's rights in the other spouse.46
B. The Related Tort of Criminal Conversation in Missouri47
The Missouri Supreme Court abolished the tort of criminal conversation by
judicial decree in 1994.48 Although the court noted that state courts in Missouri
have traditionally recognized the tort as a viable cause of action,49 the court also
noted that numerous jurisdictions throughout the country had already abolished
the tort of criminal conversation."0 Ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court
declared that it had "the authority to abolish common law torts"'" and abolished
the tort of criminal conversation.
The court listed two possible reasons why the tort of criminal conversation
came into existence.5 2 The court stated that the tort enabled aggrieved spouses
to seek compensation for injuries caused by the defendant.5 3 The court also
stated that the tort functioned to punish and deter adulterous conduct.5 4 The
court concluded, however, that the rationale for permitting aggrieved spouses to
state a claim for criminal conversation no longer existed.55 To begin with, other
45. Marshall L. Davidson, III, Comment, Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief
Goes Free, 56 TENN. L. REv. 629, 630 (1989).
46. See id. at 632. "The primary aim of the tort was to punish the willful and
malicious interference with those legally protected marital interests that each spouse is
regarded to have in the other." Id.
47. Criminal conversation and alienation of affection both involve tortious
interference with the marital relationship. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at
917-18. Typically, these two actions are alleged concurrently. See id. There is case law
stating that criminal conversation and alienation of affection "is but one tort which may
be accomplished by different means." Id. § 124, at 919; see also Skaggs v. Stanton, 532
S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ky. 1976) ("We have reached the conclusion that the time has come
to raise the curtains of confusion and hold that the tort is interference with the marriage
relation and that criminal conversation... and alienation of affections are no more than
methods by which this tort may be committed.").
48. Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994) ("This court now
abolishes the tort of criminal conversation in Missouri.").
49. Id. at 741.
50. Id.
51. Id. "With the disappearance of the reason the thing disappears; when the
reason for a rule of law fails, the rule fails." Id. (quoting State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis,
28 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Mo. 1930)).
52. See id. at 741-42.
53. Id. at 741.
54. Id. at 742.
55. Id. at 741-42.
2003]
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remedies existed that would fulfill the tort's original purpose of compensating
the aggrieved spouse.56 The court noted, for instance, that adultery is a factor to
consider in ajudicial proceeding for marital dissolution and subsequent division
of property." Also, the tort of alienation of affection has afforded plaintiffs an
alternate cause of action.18 Finally, the state no longer pursues the retributive
objective of the tort of criminal conversation.59 The court noted that adultery had
been punished under the criminal statute until the state repealed the provision in
1979.60 Since criminal conversation is the civil equivalent of the crime of
adultery, the court held that the repeal of the adultery statute evidenced a
legislative intent to no longer punish adulterous actions either by the criminal
justice system or through civil actions.6
C. The Tort ofAlienation of Affection as Applied to Employers
Jackson v. Righter62 is one of the leading cases considering an alienation of
affection claim involving the vicarious liability of an employer. Ms. Jackson, the
plaintiffs ex-wife, worked for Novell, Inc., as a secretary. 3 Ms. Jackson's
supervisor promoted her, authorized unworked overtime hours as an unofficial
raise, provided substantial bonuses, and gave Ms. Jackson gifts.64 Their
relationship became more personal, and eventually Ms. Jackson began
accompanying her supervisor on business trips.65 Ms. Jackson terminated her
affair with her supervisor after a few months, however, and began an affair with
a co-worker.66 Mr. Jackson later discovered his wife's affairs with both men and
the Jacksons attempted to reconcile without success.67 Consequently, the
Jacksons divorced.68 Mr. Jackson sued the two employees and Novell.69 His
claim against Novell was based on vicarious liability for the tortious actions of
the two employees and for negligent supervision and retention of these
56. Id. at 741.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 742.
60. Id. at 741.
61. Id.
62. 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995).
63. Id. at 1389.
64. Id. at 1389-90.
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employees.7" The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[a]n employer may be
vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the harmful
actions of an employee if those actions are committed within the scope of the
employee's employment."'" The court went on to state, however, that some
actions are "so clearly outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds
cannot differ."72 In this case, the court held that the employee's conduct was
clearly outside the scope of employment, thus abrogating any liability that could
be incurred by Novell through vicarious liability.73
The Utah Supreme Court also addressed the husband's claims for negligent
supervision and retention.7" The court refused to grant relief to the plaintiff on
these claims as well because there was no showing that the employer owed any
duty to the husband.75 The court stated that "a duty may arise when an employer
could reasonably be expected, consistent with the practical realities of an
employer-employee relationship, to appreciate the threat to a plaintiff of its
employee's actions and to act to minimize or protect against that threat. '76 The
court then held that there was no indication the employer had any knowledge or
could be reasonably expected to have knowledge of the personal relationship
between Ms. Jackson and any of its employees.77
The Utah Supreme Court also noted that there were policy reasons not to
extend liability to employers in such situations." The court held that it would be
unreasonable to require employers to ascertain the marital status of their
employees.79 Furthermore, employers should not have a duty to monitor their
employees to the extent necessary to discover any personal relationships between
two employees, especially because the relationship would likely occur outside
the scope of employment and would in some cases be impossible to discover at
all.8 Finally, the court found it persuasive that such an inquiry would effectually
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1391. To be within the scope of employment, the conduct must be of the
general nature the employee is employed to perform, it must occur during the employee's
work schedule, and the conduct must serve the employer's interests. Id.
72. Id. In such situations, the matter can be decided by summary judgment. Id.
73. Id. at 1391-92. The Utah Supreme Court held that the employee's actions were
not of the general nature for which he was employed. Id. Furthermore, the employee was
not motivated by any of the employer's interests when he allegedly acted to alienate the
wife's affection. Id.
74. Id. at 1392-94.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1392.
77. Id. Furthermore, the fact that an employer may be aware of such personal
relationships is insufficient to impute liability upon the employer. Id.
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expose the employer to liability for interfering with the personal relationship of
its employees."
D. Abolition of the Tort ofAlienation of Affection Across the Nation
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, most states have
eliminated the tort of alienation of affection.82 Thirty-four states, as well as the
District of Columbia, have abolished the common law tort through legislative
action. 3 Illinois has statutorily limited the remedy for a violation of the tort.84
In some states, the public policy against bringing an action for alienation of
affection is considered so strong that those states have enacted statutes that
criminally punish filing such lawsuits.8"
Additionally, four states have eliminated the alienation of affection cause
of action by judicial decree. 6 More than twenty years ago, Washington became
81. Id.
82. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at 930.
83. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-341 (2000); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-118-106 (Michie Supp. 2001); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572b (West 1991);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch.
771.01 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 5 1-1-17 (2000); IND. CODE § 34-12-2-1 (1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-208 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 301 (West Supp. 2001); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 3-103 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 47b (West
2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2901 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 553.02 (2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,188 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
41.380 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 2000); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a
(McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-06(1997); OHIOREv. CODEANN. § 2305.29
(Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 8.1 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.840 (2001); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1901 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-42 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-701 (2001); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.107 (Vernon 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1001 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-2a
(Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (West 2001); WVO. STAT. ANN. § 1-23-101
(Michie 2001); see also 54 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3DProofofAlienation ofAffections
§ 5 (1999).
84. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2 (2002).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 cmt. b (1977).
86. See O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986) ("Since the many
ill effects of the suit for alienation of affections outweigh any benefit it may have, we
... abolish the cause of action in Idaho."); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790,
791 (Iowa 1981) ("We have become convinced that there is inherent and fatal
contradiction in the term 'alienation of affections.' The alienation belies the affection.
Suits for alienation are useless as a means of preserving a family. They demean the
parties and the courts. We abolish such a right of recovery."); Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d
422, 427 (Ky. 1992) ("[W]e thus hold that the action for intentional interference with the
marital relation is abolished."); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (Wash. 1980)
8
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the first state to abolish the tort.87 The Washington Supreme Court based its
holding on the findings of the appellate court that the tort failed to preserve
marriages, the court system could not effectively police out-of-court settlements,
the tort promoted blackmail, no standards for assessing damages existed, and
successful prosecution of the suit amounted to little more than the sale of the
spouse's affections.8"
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the tort failed to preserve the family
unit. 9 Furthermore, the court noted that fair results are difficult to obtain in such
suits due to sympathy toward the plaintiff.9" Also, the court dismissed the notion
that any party could recover for the loss of affection from the other spouse.91
The Idaho Supreme Court, noting that both Washington and Iowa had
previously abolished the cause of action judicially, also declared that alienation
of affection would no longer be recognized in the state.92 The holding echoed
the Washington and Iowa decisions. The court stated that the tort failed to
protect the marital relationship between two spouses.93 Instead, the existence of
the tort merely provided a means whereby one spouse could seek revenge against
the defendant.94 The court also noted that juries face several problems when
serving at a trial for alienation of affection.95 First, it is difficult to determine
whether the alienated spouse, and not the defendant, was actually responsible for
the alienation.96 Second, juries are "often unduly sympathetic to the plaintiff."'97
Finally, the damages in such suits are difficult to ascertain, "making it easier for
verdicts to be tainted by passion and prejudice."98
The most recent state to judicially abolish the tort of alienation of affection,
Kentucky, has also followed many of the same rationales used by the other states
to justify its holding to no longer recognize the tort.99 The court recognized that
("We ... call for the abolition of the action for alienation of a spouse's affections.").
87. See Wyman, 615 P.2d at 455.
88. Id.; see also Wyman v. Wallace, 549 P.2d 71, 72-74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976),
aff'd, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980).
89. Funderman, 304 N.W.2d at 791.
90. Id. "It is illogical to pretend that juries can dispassionately resolve the factual
disputes in alienation suits in the same manner as in other cases." Id.
91. Id. at 794. "[P]laintiffs in such suits do not deserve to recover for the loss of
or injury to 'property' which they do not, and cannot, own." Id.
92. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986).
93. Id. "Never has there been any documentation that the existence of the action






99. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424-27.
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the tort was based on the outdated notion that the wife is property of the
husband °0 and that the tort exists today as a means to protect marriages from
intrusion by a third party.'0 ' The court cited previous decisions that abolished the
tort, stating that lawsuits for alienation of affection "invite abuse."'0 2 Also, the
suit ultimately harms the family unit, since "children [may be required] to testify
to details of the family relationship in open court."'0 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Thornburg v. Federal Express Corp., ' the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Western District addressed the trial court's holding that Mr. Thornburg
failed to state a claim for alienation of affection." The court noted that "a
plaintiff must allege that 1) the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct, 2) the
plaintiff lost the affections or consortium of his or her spouse; and 3) there was
a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs loss. ''36
Furthermore, the appellate court held that only those actions that have the
natural and probable consequences of alienating the affections of a spouse are
sufficient to impose liability on the defendant for alienation of affection.' 7 The
court then went on to find that Fed Ex's actions did not have the natural and
probable consequence of alienating the affections of Ms. Thomburg."' Instead,
the court concluded, Fed Ex's conduct was directed toward providing Ms.
Thornburg with an opportunity to transfer to another Fed Ex branch location. 9
The appellate court noted that Fed Ex's offer did not require Ms. Thornburg
to leave her husband and terminate the marital relationship that existed between
100. Id.
101. Id. at 425.
102. Id. at 427. Plaintiffs are often able to extract generous settlements by
threatening to bring the defendant's reputation into question. Id. Such settlements
amount to legally sanctioned blackmail. See id.
103. Id. (quoting O'Neil, 733 P.2d at 698).
104. 62 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
105. Id. at 425-27. This Note is primarily concerned with the tort of alienation of
affection and will not address the other torts alleged in Mr. Thornburg's complaint. It
should be noted that the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District also
addressed Mr. Thornburg's claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress and affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Mr. Thornburg's suit on those
grounds as well. See id. at 427-29.
106. Id. at 426.
107. Id. at 426-27.
108. Id. at 426.
109. Id. Fed Ex's transfer offer was made to Ms. Thomburg in light of the stress
experienced by Ms. Thornburg as the result of her affair with Mr. Hunt. Id.
[Vol. 68
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them,"' nor would Ms. Thornburg lose her job at Fed Ex had she chosen not to
accept the transfer opportunity. "' Furthermore, the court noted that when Ms.
Thomburg moved to Georgia to pursue the employment opportunity offered by
Fed Ex, Mr. Thornburg could have moved with her or could have chosen to
maintain a long distance relationship."'
Consequently, Fed Ex's action did not have the natural and probable
consequence of alienating Ms. Thomburg's affections and could not be deemed
wrongful at law. "3 Accordingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Thornburg's claim for
alienation of affection.'
V. COMMENT
The situation in Thornburg is atypical. In a typical case a spouse would
bring a claim directly against his spouse's lover, but in Thornburg, Mr.
Thornburg filed an action for alienation of affection against Fed Ex, his wife's
employer, rather than Mr. Hunt, his wife's supervisor and one-time lover."'
Even in cases where the alienated spouse does sue his spouse's employer, the
spouse is usually making an alienation of affection claim based on vicarious
liability, thus arguing that the employer should be held liable for the actions of
one of its employees." 6
In the present case, Mr. Thornburg was not basing his case on the theory of
respondeat superior. Rather, he sought compensation for damages resulting from




113. Id. at 426-27.
114. Id. at 427.
115. Id. at 424.
116. See, e.g., Hargan v. S.W. Elec. Coop., Inc., 725 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (husband sued ex-wife's employer and president of the employer's board of
directors); Mercier v. Daniels, 533 S.E.2d 877 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (husband sued
moving van supplier and its employee for actions of the employee causing the alienation
ofhis wife's affections); Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610 (S.D. 1999) (husband sued
employer for alienation of affection based on a sexual relationship between his wife and
an employee of the company); Helena Labs. Corp. v. Snyder, 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.
1994) (spouses of two employees sued the employer based on an affair between the two
employees).
117. Thornburg, 62 S.W.3d at 429. The court did, however, address the doctrine
ofrespondeat superior in the context of alienation of affection claims. Id. The appellate
court noted that the trial court found that a business cannot be vicariously liable for an
affair between one of its employees and another person because such conduct is not
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court dismissed Mr. Thornburg's claims, holding that Fed Ex's actions did not
have the natural and probable consequence of alienating Ms. Thornburg's
affection from Mr. Thornburg."'
The result reached by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District is not difficult to understand. It seems absurd for Mr. Thomburg to
blame Fed Ex for any marital difficulties he and his wife were experiencing. A
contrary decision could lead to numerous lawsuits against employers where the
only allegedly wrongful act was to provide one spouse with a career advancement
opportunity or a relocation assignment. Furthermore, the concept of the tort is
completely anachronistic in today's modem setting."9  For these reasons,
alienation of affection in Missouri should be abolished with respect to all parties.
A. The Original Purposes of Creating the Tort ofAlienation of
Affection
One of the original purposes of creating the tort of alienation of affection
was to ensure legitimate offspring and pure bloodlines. 2 The necessity of
maintaining pedigree was important to early Germanic tribes because property
was inherited through the father.' 2' This rationale for allowing the tort of
alienation of affection, however, no longer exists today. Legitimacy of children,
although still important today to some extent, does not carry the same
significance it once held. Furthermore, there are more reliable means of ensuring
the legitimacy of children if one deems it important enough to do so. The
accuracy of paternity tests has all but eliminated the need to maintain the tort as
a means of ensuring legitimate children and pure bloodlines.
The other original purpose of creating the tort of alienation of affection was
to protect a man's property interest in his wife.'22 This rationale can hardly be
cited as an acceptable reason for maintaining the tort today. Women are no
longer treated as the property of their husbands, nor are they considered to be
inferior to their husbands in the eyes of the law. As strides toward equality
between men and women have been made, 2 ' women now also possess the right
within the scope of the employee's employment. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that
an employer can only be held liable for actions taken by its employees if such actions
constitute a tort. Id. Mr. Thornburg failed to allege any such tort on the part of Mr. Hunt.
Id.
118. Id. at 426-27.
119. See generally Thomas K. Leeper, Comment, Alienation of Affections:
Flourishing Anachronism, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 585 (1977).
120. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
123. The Married Women's Property Acts "granted wives the right to own property
and to sue in their own names to recover damages for their own personal injuries." Hoye
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to bring a lawsuit against tortious wrongdoers whose actions have caused the
wife to lose the affections of her husband.'24 Even so, the notion that a person
possesses a property interest in his or her spouse and the affections of that spouse
is an anachronism.'25
B. Protection of Marriages
The most commonly cited rationale for maintaining the tort of alienation of
affection today is to protect the institution of marriage. 26 There are several
reasons, however, why the tort of alienation of affection fails to promote this
laudable goal'27 and why, in reality, bringing an action in tort for alienation of
affection may have a contrary result. 12 First, a spouse who does file a suit will
essentially be publicly acknowledging that the marriage has turned sour. 29 This
in itself is probably not harmful to the marital relationship, but the unwanted
publicity places undue stress on the marriage. 30 In actuality, the resulting stress
is more likely to harm the marriage than to preserve the relationship-such
publicity for what amounts to a personal action is unlikely to strengthen the
marital bond between the married parties and, thereby, will frustrate the purpose
of the tort in the first place.'
v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Ky. 1992) (quoting Leeper, supra note 119, at 588)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp., 62 S.W.3d 421,424 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
125. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 124, at 916 ("The idea that one spouse
can recover for an act the other spouse has willingly consented to is perhaps better suited
to an era that regarded one spouse as the property of another.").
126. Gregory L. Thompson, Note, The Suit ofAlienation of Affections: Can Its
Existence BeJustified Today?, 56 N.D. L. REv. 239,250 (1980). The state has an interest
in stabilizing familial relationships, which can be accomplished through preserving
marriages. Id. "The action [of alienation of affection] has survived in the hope that it
affords protection to familyrelationships." Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790,
791 (Iowa 1981).
127. Thompson, supra note 126, at 250-52. Fundermann, 304 N.W.2d at 791
("[The] lofty hope [of protecting the family through the continued existence of the tort
of alienation of affection] has proven illusory."); Leeper, supra note 119, at 601 ("It is
... misleading and futile to suppose that the threat of a damage suit can protect the
marital relationship.") (quoting CLARK, supra note 42, § 10.2, at 267); Wyman v.
Wallace, 549 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), aft'd, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980)
("[T]he action does not prevent human misconduct itself. In ourjudgment, the interests
which the action seeks to protect are not protected by its existence, and the harm it
engenders far outweighs any reasons for its continuance.").
128. Thompson, supra note 126, at 251.
129. Thompson, supra note 126, at 251.
130. Thompson, supra note 126, at 251.
13 1. Thompson, supra note 126, at 25 1. Often, facts will be exposed during trial
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Additionally, the action itself is normally brought after the marriage has
already dissolved and can no longer be preserved.'32 Typically, revenge, not the
desire to be compensated for the loss of a spouse's affections, is the main
motivation for bringing a suit for alienation of affection.'33 In fact, this reason
is very often cited as the reason most jurisdictions have abolished the tort of
alienation of affection.'34 The thinking is that the tort fails to preserve marriages.
Rather, it "foster[s] bitterness and promote[s] vexatious lawsuits as well as
blackmail and extortion."' 35 Ultimately, the only result of a successful suit for
an alienation of affection claim is the plaintiff's "sale of his or her spouse's
affections."'36
Also, the rationale that maintaining the tort of alienation of affection will
preserve marital relationships seems absurd in light of the divorce rate in the
United States.'37 Although the tort of alienation of affection does not require a
sexual relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse,'38 the typical
scenario does in fact involve an adulterous relationship."' The continued
existence of the tort of alienation of affection apparently had little deterrent effect
on the sexual conduct of Americans, 4 ° especially when one considers that "an
that will harm or destroy the reputation of one, or both, spouses. Id.
132. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 251.
133. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 251.
134. Proof ofAlienation of Affections, supra note 83, § 6.
135. Proof ofAlienation of Affections, supra note 83, § 6; see also 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1 (1993):
[T]he action for alienation of affections has been subjected to grave abuses
and has been used as an instrument for blackmail by unscrupulous persons for
their unjust enrichment, due to the indefiniteness of the damages recoverable
... and the consequent fear of persons threatened with such actions that
exorbitant damages might be assessed against them.
136. Proof ofAlienation of Affections, supra note 83, § 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted). "[T]he action actually hurt marriages in that it gave the plaintiff an incentive
to drag the marital relationship through court resulting in what amounted to a forced sale
of affections." O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 697 (1986).
137. Phyllis Coleman, Who's Been Sleeping in My Bed? You and Me, and the
State Makes Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399,409 (1991) (arguing that adultery laws should
be repealed for lack of any deterrent effect).
138. The elements of alienation of affection include only: (1) a wrongful act by
the defendant; (2) the loss of affections or consortium; (3) and a causal connection
between the wrongful act and the loss suffered. Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp., 62
S.W.3d 421,426 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). Proof ofAlienation of Affections,supra note 83,
§ 16 ("[A] cause of action for alienation of affection does not require that the defendant
has committed adultery with the plaintiff's spouse.").
139. Leeper, supra note 119, at 601.
140. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981).
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estimated sixty percent of American adults have extramarital affairs." ''
Furthermore, every extramarital affair would have the potential of turning into a
lawsuit for alienation of affection. If these cases were brought more often, the
courts in this country would face a significant number of alienation of affection
claims that could clog the entire judicial system.
If the goal of maintaining the tort of alienation of affection is to preserve
marriages, then the question must be asked why we then allow divorce to exist at
all. The answer is likely that every person has a fundamental right to marry'42 and
if a person chooses to no longer remained married to his or her spouse, the state
should not interfere with that person's individual choice. Because an individual's
right is so important, the rationale for permitting divorce should also apply to
eliminating the tort of alienation of affection. The continued existence of the tort
of alienation of affection does little more than infringe on an individual's right to
make decisions concerning any personal relationship in which he or she may
become involved. 1
43
Furthermore, the fact that Missouri has abolished the related tort of criminal
conversation 144 tends to support the fact that the state may not have as strong an
interest in preserving the marital relationship between two married persons. An
action for criminal conversation requires a sexual relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiffs spouse. 4  Arguably, the tort of criminal
conversation involves more wrongful conduct-because it necessarily involves
a sexual relationship-than an action for alienation of affection, which
theoretically can merely involve the defendant counseling the plaintiffs spouse
to leave the plaintiff. Still, if the Missouri Supreme Court has held that criminal
conversation should no longer be a viable tort in Missouri, 146 then there is little
rationale for allowing plaintiffs to bring an action for alienation of affection
either. 4
C. Right to Compensation for Intrusion into the Marital Relationship
The injury suffered by an aggrieved spouse in an action for alienation of
affection is the loss of the other spouse's consortium and possibly mental pain
141. Coleman, supra note 137, at 409.
142. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of
fundamental importance.").
143. See Thompson, supra note 126, at 254.
144. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the abolition of the tort of criminal
conversation in Missouri.
145. Proof ofAlienation of Affections, supra note 83, at § 4.
146. Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994).
147. Id. (Price, J., concurring) ("Many of the reasons that support abolishing the
tort of criminal conversation also apply to alienation of affection.").
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and suffering resulting from the subsequent marital discord. 4 ' Obviously, it can
no longer be reasonably argued that either spouse has a property interest in the
affections or services of the other spouse.'49 A spouse may have an interest in
maintaining the marital relation, but this right is not absolute-an individual has
a right to make decisions concerning any personal relationship in which he or she
may become involved.'° Consequently, a person has an interest in the affections
and services of his or her spouse only so long as that spouse voluntarily provides
them. The spouse cannot be compelled to provide affection without abridging his
or her individual rights. Furthermore, a third party should not be penalized when
he or she is the recipient of affection that is voluntarily given. The imposition of
such liability is almost equivalent to reinstating the rationale that individuals
possess a property interest in the affections of their spouses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The justifications for maintaining the tort of alienation of affection either no
longer exist today or are not actually promoted by the continued existence of the
tort. Furthermore, the tort is subject to abuse and may result in more harm being
done to the marital relationship than any good that may occur because of it. The
tort is a relic of a bygone era and serves only to perpetuate the notion that a
person may have a property interest in his or her spouse. Although the Thornburg
case is correctly decided, judicial resources, as well as significant monetary
expenses, were spent in litigating a suit with little merit. Missouri, therefore,
should follow the national trend in abolishing the action.
BRUCE V. NGUYEN
148. Thompson, supra note 126, at 252.
149. See supra notes 37-38, 122-25 and accompanying text.
150. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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